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Abstract
Blockchain based framework provides data
immutability in a distributed network. In this
paper, we investigate the application of blockchain
for peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. Traditional
energy trading systems use simple passing mechanisms
and basic pricing methods, thus adversely affect the
efficiency and buyers’ social welfare. We propose
a blockchain based energy trading mechanism that
uses smart passing of unspent auction reservations
to (a) minimise the time taken to settle an auction
(convergence time), (b) maximise the number of
auction settlement; and (c) incorporate second-price
auction pricing to maximise buyers’ social welfare in
a distributed double auction environment. The entire
mechanism is implemented within Hyperledger Fabric,
an open-source blockchain framework, to manage
the data and provide smart contracts. Experiments
show that our approach minimises the convergence
time, maximises the number of auction settlement, and
increases the social welfare of buyers compared to
existing methods.
1. Introduction
Blockchain provides a data structure and an
operating environment which ensure the immutability
of distributed ledgers over a distributed network
[1]. The data structure is made up of timestamped
blocks interlinked using cryptographic hash functions,
thus enabling audit trails including detection of data
tampering [2] [3] [4]. Smart contracts, computer scripts
within the distributed system, append new data in the
blockchain. Valid users execute these smart contracts to
conduct all functionality related to data read and write:
they are the interface between peers and blockchain
ledgers [5]. Smart contracts enable decentralisation
because there is no central point of execution and this
is a departure from traditional database systems [6];
therefore removing the intermediaries, reducing broker
fees [7] and market settlement cost [8]. A decentralised
system is more vulnerable to security threats but the
blockchain data structure and smart contracts provide
in-built security measures [9] [10].
Due to the distributed nature of blockchain
technology and geographic dispersion of business
activities; blockchain has gained attention from various
sectors such as supply chain [11], electric vehicle
operations [12], and energy trading [13] [14] [15].
Thakur et al. [15] showed how peer based local double
auction can enhance social welfare by passing unspent
auction reservations to the neighbour peer. However,
the passing mechanism is naive as it overlooks the
further auction capability of neighbour auctioneer, it
has negative impact on efficiency (convergence time
and number auction settlement) and buyers’ social
welfare. We call the peers as auctioneers who settle
local auction. Some of the challenges within the energy
trading environment include but not limited to pricing,
transparency, efficiency of the auction mechanism, and
social welfare of both buyers and sellers. The objective
of this paper is to (a) minimise the convergence time,
(b) maximise the number of auction settlements, and (c)
improve buyers’ social welfare in a distributed double
auction. In a double auction: both buyers and sellers
propose a set of prices being distributed, and several
auctioneers conduct the auctions. To understand how
this works, we first describe how blockchain fits in a
distributed double auction environment.
Figure 1 shows how blockchain fits in a distributed
double auction environment. This trading environment
has buyers (B1, B2...Bn), sellers (S1, S2...Sn), and
auctioneers (A1, A2...An). Note that buyers, sellers and
auctioneers are peers in a blockchain ecosystem and
they communicate with the blockchain network through
smart contracts for all buying/selling reservations and
auctioning. All auction logics and data access requests
are processed through smart contracts in this distributed
system.
Energy trading in smart grids is an application
that requires decentralisation in a distributed secure





Figure 1. Blockchain in a double auction setting,
which comprises buyers (B1, B2...Bn), sellers
(S1, S2...Sn), and auctioneers (A1, A2...An)
environment. Peer based energy trading facilitates
distributed operation of network to better utilize grid
assets and energy resources [1]. The rise in the
renewable energy sector (such as rooftop solar panels)
turns consumers into producers, collectively known as
prosumers [8]. As such, it makes sense to support
these prosumers so they can trade with other prosumers
within the smart grids: this is a departure from current
practice which allows prosumers to trade with only a
central energy provider. To shift from a central trading,
we need a mechanism to support pricing and auction
settlement in distributed peer-to-peer energy trading.
The pricing will affect the social welfare of prosumers
and the auction settlement will affect the efficiency of
the energy trading process.
In this paper, we propose a blockchain based
distributed double auction model to (a) minimise the
convergence time (time taken to settle an auction),
(b) maximise the number of auctions settlement, and
(c) maximise buyers’ social welfare. The blockchain
framework provides the backbone of the entire
peer-to-peer (P2P) energy network using smart contracts
as an interface between peers and data (blockchain
ledgers). Using Hyperledger Fabric, an open-source
blockchain platform [16], the entire mechanism is
implemented to manage the data and provide smart
contracts. Both buyers and sellers are peers and some of
the peers become auctioneer to contribute to the energy
trading.
We organise the rest of the paper as follows. In
Section 2, we provide relevant background information
on double auction and second-price auction. Then in
Section 3, we introduce our proposed model. After
that, in Section 4, we describe the experimental setup of
the proposed model. Then we describe the experiment
results and analysis in Section 5. The paper concludes
with a direction for future work in Section 6.
2. Traditional Energy Trading
Mechanisms
The most straightforward auction process is the
first-price auction, where buyers propose buying prices
and the buyer with the highest bid wins: the auction
price is the highest price. A variation of this is the
second-price auction, where the winner of an auction
pays the second highest price [17] [18]. An alternative
to the highest bidding pricing method is second-price
auction: the bidder who bids the highest amount wins
the auction but pays at the second-highest price [17]
[18]. As buyers pay less than the highest bidding price,
they reap more benefit (profit) than that of the first-price
auction. This profit contributes to social welfare of
buyers, which is measured in terms of utility. If a buyer
bids at price b and pays p, then the utility is b − p: the
buyer tends to pay less than the bidding price [19]. In
the second-price auction method, if there is no second
bidder in the auction then the auction may not settle. To
avoid this situation, Chen et al. [20] introduced a bid
floor which is set by the auction authority and we used
as a second price when there is no second bidder.
The auctioning process becomes more complicated
in the double auction, where buyers propose buying
prices and sellers propose selling prices [21]. This is
more complex as the auction price depends not only on
the proposed buying prices but also on the proposed
selling prices. The following section describes the
process of finding an auction price in a double auction.
We can settle a double auction if and when it reaches
an equilibrium point [15] [22] :
• Sort the buying reservation prices R(Bi=1...N) in
descending order
• Sort the selling reservation prices R(Si=1...N) in
ascending order
• The equilibrium point is when R(Bi)< = R(Si)
Figure 2 shows double auction price determination
and total utility of buyers. In addition, it shows the
utility gain when we incorporate second-price method
on double auction for price determination; we discuss
this situation in next section. In the same figure, R(Bi)
is the buying reservation curve which has a down-word
slope and R(Si) is the reservations from the sellers
which has an up-word slope. The equilibrium price
is where these two curves intersect and at this point
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Figure 2. Buyers utility when using double auction
for auction price determination and utility gain for
buyers when using second-price on double auction for
price determination
R(Bi)< = R(Si). We mark it as DP EQ. As they
intersect at DP EQ, QE becomes equilibrium quantity.
So, QE number of energy units will be sold at DP EQ
price. DP EQ is the auction price (equilibrium price);
where i = 1...QE and we use following equation to find
this equilibrium price in double auction.
DP EQ = (R(Bi) + R(Si))/2 ...(1)
At this price (DPEQ) we calculate buyers utility
benefit, which represents social welfare. In the energy
market, the maximisation of social welfare plays a
vital role [23]. Maximising buyers’ social welfare
attracts more buyers and hopefully more sellers within





Some researchers tried to maximise social welfare
in distributed energy trading, such as Thakur et al. [15]
and Majumder et al. [24]. Hassija et al. [7] and Tushar
et al. [21] introduced another pricing method; which is
peer based local double auction through smart contracts
in distributed setup. This gives more social welfare
to prosumers. Further enhancement by incorporating
second-price auction method on double auction method
is possible as it can increase social welfare of buyers. To
the best of our knowledge, there has been no work that
incorporates second-price auction method into a double
auction method.
In the next section, we describe how the double
auction fits in the blockchain environment.
3. Proposed Blockchain Based Energy
Trading Mechanism
In a traditional environment, one central auctioneer
processes all buying and selling reservations. However,
in the context of energy trading in microgrids, having
multiple auctioneers has the following advantages:
• Reduction in the total convergence time (the
time taken to settle an auction) because multiple
auctions can coincide [15].
• Reduction in electricity transmission cost because
physically close peers trade with each other [7]
[15] [8].
Figure 3. Levels in Peer-to-Peer Microgrid
Neighbourhood
When a trading environment has multiple
auctioneers, the auctioning process becomes distributed,
hence the name distributed double auction. A distributed
double auction introduces another complexity. In a
centralised double auction, the auctioneer has all the
buying and selling reservations, but in a distributed
scenario, an auctioneer may have only a subset of
these reservations. As such, the auctioneers may
not be able to satisfy all reservations in the entire
trading ecosystem. One method to overcome this
issue is to pass reservations that could not be settled
to other auctioneers. We call such reservations as
unspent reservations. According to Figure 3, immediate
neighbours of Auctioneer 1 are Auctioneer 2 and
Auctioneer 3. Peer 1 to 3 are closest to Auctioneer 1
(Level 0) and are further away from Auctioneer 2 and
Auctioneer 3 (Level 1).
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In a recently reported work by Thakur et al. [15],
an auctioneer passes any unspent reservations to its
immediate neighbours, hoping that they will be able
to conduct an auction. Further, in [15], they used the
double auction to minimise the overall convergence time
without considering buyers’ social welfare. They also
passed unspent auction reservations to an immediate
neighbour without considering the possibility of future
auction capability of the immediate neighbour and this
may adversely impact the overall convergence time.
In our proposed model, we combine the second-price
auction method to maximise buyers’ social welfare
and using a bid floor (acceptable minimum price) to
protect seller’s social welfare. In other words; the
bid floor can contribute to ensuring the smart grid
trading system is financially sustainable. Maximising
buyers’ social welfare may encourage more buyers in
the market, but as buyers have the potential to be sellers
as well, indirectly we may have more sellers entering the
market. To maximise buyers’ social welfare as well as
minimising the overall convergence time, we introduced
two changes: (1) incorporate second-price auction
method into distributed double auction mechanism to
maximise the social welfare of the buyers, (2) provide
asynchronous auctions with smart passing of unspent
auction reservations to reduce the overall convergence
time. We also use blockchain to manage data and
provide smart contracts for delivering all services.
Figure 4. Operations of the Proposed Model in
Blockchain Environment
As auction reservations from energy generating and
producing houses will be generated based on their
energy requirement, there will be multiple auction
reservations for each auction settlement throughout the
microgrid. Figure 4 shows all the necessary activities
from a peer and an auctioneer. These activities are
executed through smart contracts: Peeri generates a new
energy reservation for buying or selling using smart
contracts and Auctioneeri passes unspent reservations
and conducts the auctions via smart contracts. The
following sub-sections describe our proposed model
in more detail. Following sub-section describes
the trading mechanism, including smart passing of
unspent auction reservations and the incorporation of the
second-price method into blockchain based distributed
double auction. The sub-section after the following one
describes the design aspects of blockchain.
3.1. Trading Mechanism
As shown in Figure 4, a peer within the network
can make buying or selling reservation requests by
executing a smart contract. Smart contract gives
the initial submission to the auctioneer closest to the
requesting peer. The selected auctioneer conducts
the auction if it has matching auction reservation
requests or passes the request to other auctioneers.
The mechanism for passing the requests is central to
minimising the convergence time, while second-price
method will improve buyers’ social welfare. This
sub-section includes novel approaches for smart passing
of unspent auction reservations and second-price auction
in blockchain based distributed double auction.
3.1.1. Smart Passing of Unspent Auction
Reservations. To facilitate smart passing of unspent
auction reservations, our blockchain based distributed
double auction model maintains the information
about the neighbourhood auctioneer data and unspent
reservation profile of all auctioneers as two matrices.
• Neighbourhood auctioneer data: This data
provides the information on who the neighbouring
auctioneers are and used to find neighbour
auctioneers [15]. The neighbourhood data are
stored in an undirected graph (implemented as a
2D matrix) stored as a block in our simulation’s
Hyperledger Fabric. We denote this graph as peer
connection profile. Note that each auctioneer may
receive reservation requests from multiple peers
as shown in Figure 3. According to Thakur et
al. [15] if the peers in Level 0 generates energy
reservations, then an auctioneer can be selected
only from the neighbours among the same or next
level as depicted in Figure 3.
• Unspent reservation profile of all auctioneer
peers: The unspent reservation profile (URP)
stores the number of unspent auction reservations
allocated for any auctioneer for a certain period of
time, as seen in Figure 5 and A1, A2...A5 are the
auctioneers. Before Time 3, A4 has –1 (buying)
unspent auction reservation, so it needs 1 (selling)
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unspent auction reservation for an auction to
settle. On the other hand, at the same time, A1
has 1 as unspent reservation (one unspent selling
reservation) so it can satisfy one buyer. A2, A3
and A5 have no unspent reservation, but A3 can
settle two auctions and A5 is capable of settling
three auctions.
Figure 5. Smart Passing of Unspent Auction
Reservations
The processes for smart passing are as follow. The
passing rule selects the most capable neighbouring
auctioneer that has matching unspent reservations.
Figure 5 depicts the passing process. Red dots denote
auction reservations from buyers, green dots from
sellers. The numbers in ellipses refer to the number of
auctions settled at times mentioned. Solid lines with
arrows represent the smart passing of unspent auction
reservations when no auction is settled. Dashed lines
with arrows indicate the unspent reservations stay with
the same auctioneer.
Smart contract in blockchain decides auction
capability based on the URP matrix. In Figure 5, A1
and A4 each have one unspent auction reservation before
Time 3. In this case, A1 can pass the unspent auction
reservation to A4 or vice versa. The auctioneer that
will pass is randomly selected. The same figure shows
that at Time 3 A1 passes to A4. The smart contract
updates this matrix, so the URP for A1 and A4 are
now 0 immediately after Time 3: A4 can now settle
an auction. As in [15], we limit the number of passes
of an auction reservation using a trail number and this
number is incremented by one for each pass. This is
to ensure that trading should take place with physically
close peers. The trail number represents convergence
time [15]. Between Time 3 and 6, A4 has two auction
reservations (one red dot and one green dot), so smart
contract settles one auction on behalf of A4 at Time 6
(no more dots and one yellow ellipse to indicate one
successful auction). The passing mechanism is the same
for A2 when it has 1 buying reservation. Between
Time 12 and 15, A4 receives one selling request. As
no other auctioneer available in the neighbourhood that
has at least one buying unspent reservation, A4 cannot
settle this auction: Time 15 is the expiration time of the
auction, so it can no longer pass this request.
The auction mechanism will determine the winners
in the auction and the buying/selling price as explained
in the following section.
Figure 6. Incorporating second-price method into
double auction. The equilibrium price is 13¢, the
average price of proposed buying and selling prices
when R(Bi)< = R(S i). The average of the
second-prices (R(Bi+1) +R(S i-1))/2 is 11.5¢
Recall that in a double auction, both the
buyers and sellers propose buying and selling prices.
We incorporate second-price method in the double
auction method. Traditionally the auction price is the
equilibrium price in a double auction. However, in
our proposed model, we determine the auction price
by applying second price method on double auction
equilibrium price. The following paragraphs describe
how we incorporate the second-price auction method
into a double auction method.
3.1.2. Second-price in Double Auction. Using
Figure 6 as an example, the equilibrium price is 13¢
in double auction, but the auction price is 11.5¢ when
we incorporate second-price auction method on double
auction equilibrium price. This is because R(Bi+1) is
11¢ and R(Si-1) is 12¢ , and hence the average price
is 11.5¢ . Although any peer can sell or buy electricity,
only auctioneers can conduct the auction or pass unspent
auction reservations (the auctioneers are pre-selected
peers within the blockchain network).
Figure 2 depicts that: when we incorporate
second-price method on double auction method, the
equilibrium price curve shifts to SP EQ point. Equation
1 shows; to choose double auction price we use ith
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price for both buyers and sellers. To determine auction
price using second-price method by considering double
auction, we pick (i+1)th price from buyers reservations
and (i − 1)th price from sellers reservations. For
both parties, it leads to a lower price. This shifts the
auction price equilibrium from DP EQ to SP EQ; where
i = 1...QE and we use following equation to find
equilibrium price by incorporating second-price auction
on double auction.
SP EQ = (R(Bi+1) + R(Si-1))/2 ...(3)
Due to the shift of equilibrium price (from DPEQ to
SPEQ), buyers gain additional utility. We formulate this
utility gain as:
∆U = (DP EQ − SP EQ)QE ...(4)
So, upon incorporation of second-price on double
auction method, total utility of buyers becomes:
When total utility of buyers in double auction is:
TU(BDDA) and total utility of buyers is: TU(BSP)
if we incorporate second-price on double auction
method. Our simulation and results section shows that:
TU(BDDA)<TU(BSP).
Algorithm 1 Pricing using second-price method on
double auction
Data: R(Bi) and R(Si) reservation price of buyer Bi and
seller Si respectively.
Result: Settlement of auction price incorporating
second price method on double auction.
Begin
Sort reservation price of buyers in descending order
Sort reservation price of sellers in ascending order
auctionPrice← 0
equilibriumQ← R(B).length
if equilibriumQ ≥ R(S).length then
equilibriumQ← R(S).length
end if
for i← 1 to equilibriumQ do
if R(Bi) ≤ R(Si) then





Peers from 1 to i trade at auctionPrice
end if
The description above shows the algorithmic steps of
a system that incorporates second-price auction method
into double auction method for pricing in a blockchain
based distributed peer-to-peer energy trading. The smart
contracts in the blockchain environment carry out these
steps.
3.2. Blockchain Framework
Figure 7 shows the design of blocks and blockchain
network in more detail, which also form a component
of the proposed method. It shows unspent reservation
profile, auction reservation data, auction data, and
neighbourhood data and they are all stored in a
blockchain ledger. We call this ledger as energy ledger.
Smart contract conducts the auction, reads ledger, add
new bids, finds neighbour, etc., upon request from peers
within the network. Effectively, a smart contract updates
the energy ledger. As this is a distributed system all
peers in the network has access to the smart contract. In
other words, the same set of rules or logics are available
to all the peers across the peer-to-peer distributed double
auction network.
Figure 7. Blockchain design in Hyperledger Fabric
for the proposed distributed double auction model
Thus, the blockchain design for the proposed
distributed double auction model has these three features
(a) all data required for peer-to-peer distributed double
auction are stored in the ledger within Hyperledger
Fabric. (b) the required set of rules for activities are
stored in the form of programming script within a smart
contract (c) the peers execute the smart contracts.
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4. Experiment Setup
To evaluate our proposed smart passing of
unspent auction reservation and second-price auction
in a distributed double auction, we simulated three
peer-to-peer distributed double auction scenarios.
The first scenario is the traditional distributed double
auction (DDA), which uses the equilibrium price as
the auction price and conventional passing of unspent
auction reservations developed by Thakur et al. [15];
this forms the baseline. The second scenario is unspent
reservations with smart passing (URS1). The third
scenario is unspent reservations with smart passing and
second-price (URS2).
We consider three evaluation metrics to measure the
performance of the three trading mechanisms:
i Convergence time indicated by the trail number to
settle an auction.
ii Number of settled auctions in a 24 hours trading.
iii Utility of auction price data from successful
reservations of all buyers.
The first two metrics measure the efficiency of a
trading mechanism and the third metric measures the
social welfare of the buyers.
4.1. Environment
The peer-to-peer double auction trading environment
is simulated in Hyperledger Fabric, which provides
facilities for setting up required peers, smart contracts
and blockchain data ledgers. Hyperledger Fabric is
installed within a Virtual Machine with 6.5 GB of
RAM and 30 GB of disk space. Peers are established
according to a varied requirement under a single
organisation within Hyperledger Fabric. A smart
contract in Hyperledger Fabric can be written in any of
JavaScript, Java or Golang, but for our simulation, it is
written in JavaScript. In Hyperledger Fabric, a smart
contract can update a block but it maintains a history of
all changes. Hyperledger Fabric is used as a blockchain
platform: where all the peer houses and auctioneers are
setup.
4.2. Energy Data
We used two major types of data in the experiments.
The first data represents demand and supply data
generated from 100 household meters with 5 minutes
interval, courtesy of Thakur et al. [15]. The demand
profiles data include 24 hours of demand records of 100
houses, and supply profiles data include photovoltaics
data generated from the same houses throughout the day.
From this data we take demand and supply profiles of
the peak hours only. We consider 04:40 AM to 07:10
PM as peak time in our simulations. These data are
converted to 15 minutes interval as meters in Australia
give a reading in every 15 minutes. A meter, on behalf
of a seller or buyer, is responsible for generating supply
or demand data respectively. We assume that each
meter generates 1 kWh of supply or demand. The
second type of data is the peer connection profile and
the connectivity between peers are assigned randomly.
Directly connected peers are immediate neighbours and
they are physically close to each other.
Using the demand and supply as inputs, the
simulation process generates three types of information:
unspent reservation profile, auction reservation data and
neighbour auctioneer data.
4.3. Data Storage within Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric facilitates data storage in
blockchain ledger where the unit of data is a block
and the smart contract is the interface to access that
ledger. For our purpose of simulation, supply-demand
data are updated through smart contract upon request
of meters on behalf of peers. Peer connection profile in
the ecosystem is loaded into the blockchain ledger as a
block at the start of the simulation. Unspent reservation
profile is a matrix and stored as another block in the
ledger, which is updated when each unspent auction
reservation is passed to an eligible auctioneer. Auction
reservation data hold auction reservation price, trail
number, auction price, etc. Each auction reservation
resides in a block in the ledger. Similarly, the neighbour
auctioneer data also resides in the ledger as a block. All
data are updated through smart contract upon request
from buyers or sellers in the ecosystem.
5. Simulation and Results
In this section we discuss and analyse the results of
the simulation.
5.1. Simulation
We ran three different scenarios (DDA, URS1, and
URS2) as described in Section 4 and measure their
performance using the three metrics, which were also
described in Section 4. In our experiments, we executed
a set of all auctioneers asynchronously, assuming that all
of them may have some energy reservations for further
auction settlement.
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• We analyse the performance of the distributed
double auction and smart passing of unspent
auction reservation (URS1) by convergence time
required to settle all auctions in peak hours. To
evaluate convergence time from the simulation
we collected trail numbers of successful energy
auction reservations. For the comparison with
URS1 we also simulated other approaches (DDA
and URS2). As URS1 and URS2 include the
smart passing of unspent auction reservation
strategy, they will lead to better performance than
DDA approach.
• We observe the auction throughput by the number
of successful auctions processed by auctioneers
with URS1 approach. We also simulate other
approaches for comparison (DDA and URS2).
As URS1 and URS2 include the smart passing
of unspent auction reservation strategy, they will
lead to more throughput than DDA approach.
• The utility of the buyers from all successful
auction reservations (processed by URS2) are
considered to measure the social welfare of
buyers. Other approaches (DDA and URS1) are
also simulated to compare the utility concerning
social welfare. To analyse social welfare, we
record auction settlement prices of successful
auction reservations. Auction reservation prices
are placed by buyers or sellers by keeping a range.
For our experiment, the price range is 12¢ to 14¢.
So, all the auction reservations made by all parties
are kept between this range.
In the second-price auction method, the auction price
is the second-highest price. When there is no second
bidder then we use a bid floor of 10¢ as the second price.
All three experiments use the same dataset so we can
compare the performance from DDA, URS1, and URS2.
5.2. Results
We compare the performance of the three algorithms
using three metrics: convergence time, number of
successful auctions, and buyers utility (figures 8 to 10).
Both URS1 and URS2 outperform DDA in all three
metrics. URS1 and URS2 have similar convergence
time and total number of successful auctions, but URS2
has better buyers’ social welfare than URS1. We discuss
the results in more detail below.
Figure 8 shows the efficiency of the three approaches
by measuring the convergence time: both URS1 and
URS2 converge earlier than the traditional double
auction approach (DDA). All the auction reservations
Figure 8. Convergence Time vs. Successful Energy
Reservations for Three Approaches where DDA:
distributed double auction approach, URS1: smart
passing of unspent auction reservation with DDA,
URS2: second-price auction with URS1
of URS1 converge within five trails, while for URS2
six trails. However, DDA takes a longer time (up to
eight trails) to converge. It is also interesting to see
that the convergence time between URS1 and URS2 are
comparable, with URS2 being slightly better. As we
are using the newly designed smart passing of unspent
auction reservation approach in both URS1 and URS2,
the unspent auction reservations are passed efficiently.
Hence, the convergence time for these two approaches
is better than DDA.
Figure 9. Number of Successful Auctions for Three
Approaches
Figure 9 shows the efficiency of the performance
of the three approaches concerning the total number
of successful auctions of day-time trading. URS1 and
URS2 settle higher number of auctions, whereas for
each of the time slots DDA produces almost half of the
auction compared to other two. While URS1 and URS2
are comparable, the URS2 processes the most number
of auctions when combining the second-price auction
method into the double auction method with unspent
auction reservation approach. URS1 has slightly fewer
number of successful auctions when using smart passing
of unspent auction reservation approach and calculating
the auction price using only double auction method.
DDA performs the worst because it lacks smart passing
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of unspent auction reservation approach.
Figure 10. Comparison of Buyer’s Utility for Three
Approaches
Figure 10 shows the buyers’ social welfare for the
three approaches. To measure the social welfare of
buyers, we used buyers’ utility. The buyers’ utility
of DDA and URS1 are comparable: only these two
methods use the equilibrium price as the auction price.
On the other hand, URS2 generates almost four times
of utility for buyers: it is the best performing method
as it uses the second-price auction and distributed
double auction with smart passing of unspent auction
reservation approach.
From these experiments, it can be observed that a
combination of double auction and smart passing of
unspent auction reservation gives a superior auction
convergence. This method can be further improved by
using the second-price auction: together they offer a
better utility and auction convergence time.
6. Conclusion
This paper presented a blockchain framework for
implementing a novel energy trading mechanism.
Auction performance and the social welfare of buyers
are major concerns in this blockchain based distributed
double auction. Passing unspent auction reservations to
immediate neighbours affects the auction convergence
which in turn affects the overall auction performance.
On the other hand, buyers’ utility becomes an essential
factor for social welfare to attract more buyers in the
auction process. As smart contracts and the blockchain
environment reduce the cost of market settlement and
enhance data immutability, a modern distributed auction
market can use this trading mechanism in a blockchain
based microgrid energy network ecosystem.
In this paper, we proposed a distributed double
auction model that includes smart passing of unspent
auction reservations to improve convergence time
and the second-price auction method in a double
auction method to improve buyers’ utility. Experiment
results show that in comparison with the existing
distributed double auction method, our newly designed
passing mechanism and pricing method gives superior
performance in terms of auction convergence and
buyers’ utility. Design aspects of blockchain are
intricate and pose new challenges that need to be
addressed with further research.
One possible future extension of this work is to
consider the price as another criterion to pass unspent
reservations and to allow trading of variable energy
quantity (not fixed at 1kWh), which will lead to
maximum number of energy quantity to be traded.
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“Decentralized p2p energy trading under network
constraints in a low-voltage network,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 5,
pp. 5163–5173, 2018.
[10] D. Tse, B. Zhang, Y. Yang, C. Cheng, and H. Mu,
“Blockchain application in food supply information
security,” in 2017 IEEE international conference on
industrial engineering and engineering management
(IEEM), pp. 1357–1361, IEEE, 2017.
[11] A. Mentsiev, E. Guzueva, S. Yunaeva, M. Engel, and
M. Abubakarov, “Blockchain as a technology for the
transition to a new digital economy,” in Journal of
Physics: Conference Series, vol. 1399, p. 033113, IOP
Publishing, 2019.
[12] M. Andoni, V. Robu, D. Flynn, S. Abram, D. Geach,
D. Jenkins, P. McCallum, and A. Peacock, “Blockchain
technology in the energy sector: A systematic review
of challenges and opportunities,” Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 100, pp. 143–174,
2019.
[13] J. Wu and N. K. Tran, “Application of blockchain
technology in sustainable energy systems: An overview,”
Sustainability, vol. 10, no. 9, p. 3067, 2018.
[14] J. Lin, M. Pipattanasomporn, and S. Rahman,
“Comparative analysis of auction mechanisms and
bidding strategies for p2p solar transactive energy
markets,” Applied energy, vol. 255, p. 113687, 2019.
[15] S. Thakur, B. P. Hayes, and J. G. Breslin, “Distributed
double auction for peer to peer energy trade using
blockchains,” in 2018 5th International Symposium
on Environment-Friendly Energies and Applications
(EFEA), pp. 1–8, IEEE, 2018.
[16] C. Cachin et al., “Architecture of the hyperledger
blockchain fabric,” in Workshop on distributed
cryptocurrencies and consensus ledgers, vol. 310,
Chicago, IL, 2016.
[17] S. Bikhchandani, “Reputation in repeated second-price
auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 46, no. 1,
pp. 97–119, 1988.
[18] K. Omote and A. Miyaji, “A second-price sealed-bid
auction with verifiable discriminant of p 0-th root,” in
International Conference on Financial Cryptography,
pp. 57–71, Springer, 2002.
[19] R. P. McAfee, “A dominant strategy double auction,”
Journal of economic Theory, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 434–450,
1992.
[20] B. R. Chen and Y. S. Chiu, “Competitive bidding with
a bid floor,” International Journal of Economic Theory,
vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 351–371, 2011.
[21] W. Tushar, T. K. Saha, C. Yuen, D. Smith, and H. V.
Poor, “Peer-to-peer trading in electricity networks: An
overview,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 11,
no. 4, pp. 3185–3200, 2020.
[22] Z. Zhao, K. Nakayama, and R. Sharma, “Decentralized
transactive energy auctions with bandit learning,” in
2019 IEEE PES Transactive Energy Systems Conference
(TESC), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2019.
[23] X. Zou, “Double-sided auction mechanism design in
electricity based on maximizing social welfare,” Energy
Policy, vol. 37, no. 11, pp. 4231–4239, 2009.
[24] B. P. Majumder, M. N. Faqiry, S. Das, and A. Pahwa,
“An efficient iterative double auction for energy
trading in microgrids,” in 2014 IEEE Symposium on
Computational Intelligence Applications in Smart Grid
(CIASG), pp. 1–7, IEEE, 2014.
Page 6022
